King County Elections Public Comment on Proposed Rule, “Ballot Mail for Federal Elections”, 39 CFR Part 111, Federal Register Document No. 2026-10968

Director,

King County Elections (Washington) strongly opposes the United States Postal Service’s proposed rule related to mailing ballots and election mail. We urge USPS not to finalize nor implement this rule as it would infringe our state’s constitutionally mandated authority to determine the manner and method of our own elections, it will result in eligible voters not being able to cast their ballot in a timely manner, and will cause irreparable harm to the fabric of our democracy. Instead, USPS should withdraw this rule from consideration.

USPS has been a valued partner to election administrators in vote-by-mail elections since the American Civil War. At no point in that history has USPS ever held the role of deciding who should receive their ballot or election mail, essentially deciding who has the right to vote and who does not. That role and responsibility has always belonged to the trained and experienced election administrators that run free and fair elections in this country month after month, year after year, and decade after decade.

We submit this comment as election experts representing one of the largest vote-by-mail jurisdictions in the nation and the 12th largest county overall. King County Elections (KCE) conducts accurate, secure, and accessible elections for more than 1.4 million registered voters in King County, Washington. Guided by values of accuracy, equity, integrity, service, teamwork, and transparency, our team includes state and nationally certified election administrators with extensive experience not only running vote by mail elections but setting the standard for them. KCE is recognized across the country for innovation, efficiency, community outreach, and expanding cross-partisan opportunities for election observation. We strive to lead the way in providing inclusive, accessible elections.

King County, WA has been conducting elections entirely by mail since 2009 and prior to that, the overwhelming majority of voters had elected to vote by mail. We have long appreciated the Postal Service’s work to support election officials and, most importantly, voters. Our partnership with USPS has led to successful initiatives here in King County and Washington State to improve voter access, such as moving to prepaid postage for return ballots. Working with USPS on mail ballot visibility, effective envelope design, and clear communication is a critical and valuable operational practice. During elections our team is in constant communication with USPS to reduce processing issues and support the timely delivery of ballots.

Elections offices and USPS both play vital roles in our elections, with election administrators responsible for maintaining voter records, determining voter eligibility, verifying voter identity, and, of course, issuing and ultimately tabulating ballots. USPS reliably delivers ballots and all other mail to mailboxes across King County and this country.

Proposed Rule 2026-10968, Ballot Mail for Federal Elections, will have significant negative impacts on voter access and may prevent the ballots of eligible voters from making their way through the mail stream quickly, efficiently, and with precision. The rule does not reflect the operational realities of vote by mail. Ballots are not mailed just once. Instead, they are mailed in waves with initial drops at different times for different voter groups, followed by daily mailings for replacement ballots, new registrations, updated addresses, and more.

As stated above, we strongly urge USPS not to finalize this rule. To implement any election-related rule, USPS must engage with election administrators to better understand the complexities of vote-by-mail and elections in general. They must also develop a realistic timeline for testing technical requirements, establish and detail privacy protections and safeguards, and create and test emergency procedures to ensure that technical or administrative issues do not delay ballots nor cost Americans their right to vote.

That engagement has not happened, and it is clear from the proposed rule that there needs to be significant education on how vote by mail works in both policy and practice.

Nonacceptance of Outbound Ballot Mail (DMM 705.24.5)

KCE’s most grave concern is the proposed nonacceptance remedy. To put it simply, every possible measure must be taken to ensure that ballots reach voters on time.

Under this proposed rule, any ballot mail that does not comply with the verification requirements would be rejected and returned to the authorized ballot mailer until the errors are corrected. This is simply unacceptable and will leave eligible voters disenfranchised and without a voice in our democracy.

The nonacceptance of outbound ballots — especially close to statutory mailing deadlines — introduces substantial election risk and directly threatens to disenfranchise voters.

If ballots are delayed due to a technical mismatch, portal malfunction, or other administrative or technical error, voters may receive their ballots later than intended through no fault of their own. It is unacceptable to leave someone’s right to vote up to whether a data set matches properly or whether a not-yet-created portal functions properly. Through absolutely no fault of their own, voters could find themselves stripped of one of their most basic and fundamental rights as an American, the right to vote.

A person’s right to vote cannot and should not be left up to the United States Postal Service’s ability to accurately process and manage data, particularly when that process and management is entirely new and untested.

Envelope Design and Review Standards (DMM 705.24.3)

Under the proposed rule, envelope design standards that have long been touted by USPS as a best practice for ballot envelope design would become a mandatory requirement.

King County’s outbound and return envelopes already include the Official Election Mail logo, meet automation compatibility standards, and have undergone review by USPS Mail Design Analysts for many years. Additionally, most of our outbound envelopes include unique Intelligent Mail barcodes (IMbs) to support visibility and troubleshooting delivery issues.

However, the proposed standard would require all outbound and return ballots to include unique IMbs. Currently, our return ballot envelopes use a generic IMb that identifies our election office as the destination. For a period of time, we paid additional fees — up to $30,000 for a countywide election — to include unique IMbs on return envelopes in an effort to improve tracking.

Despite this significant investment, only a small percentage of returned ballots actually received scans from USPS. For example, in the February 2025 Special Election, of the 120,318 ballots returned via USPS, the data shows:

• Only 31,602 received an outbound scan (26% of ballots delivered)
• Only 26,380 received an “in transit” scan (22% of ballots delivered)
• Only 5,222 received a delivery scan (4% of ballots delivered)

Given both the low scan rates and significant financial burden, we discontinued printing unique IMbs on return envelopes. The return on investment simply isn’t there, particularly when we are spending Americans’ hard-earned tax dollars to pay for it.

Our office does not have funding to resume this practice, nor would it be in the financial best interest of King County and Washington State to add these unique IMbs back to return envelopes.

Additionally, we, like most election administrators around the country, rely on using remaining envelope inventory from prior elections to reduce costs.  The proposed requirement for unique IMbs for the general election would force us to purchase new envelopes at additional expense that we simply cannot absorb.

Furthermore, ballots issued in our office are produced in-house with labels generated directly from our election management system, which doesn’t have the ability to generate unique IMbs, leaving voters who pick up their replacement ballot in-person behind.

Washington voters are also legally permitted to download and print replacement ballots through the online ballot marking program, and that system likewise cannot produce unique IMbs.

The proposed standard does not account for these operational realities or the significant financial burden it would impose on already resource-constrained local election offices and should not be implemented.

Mail-In and Absentee Participation List (DMM 705.24.4)

Ballot Portal Requirements

The proposed rule requires a list of voters to be uploaded to a ballot portal “30 days before the date of the federal election, to the extent practicable, or by the date on which mail-in or absentee ballots may begin to be mailed under state law.” Again, this requirement does not reflect the operational realities of election administration.

In Washington State and many others, new voters can register through Election Day, and existing voters can update their address through Election Day. Any list uploaded 30 days before a federal election will be significantly outdated by the time ballots are mailed and even more outdated by the time Election Day rolls around.

In addition, the proposed rule offers no details on how the portal will function, how long USPS will take to process list updates, or how delays will be avoided. As noted above, ballots are not mailed once; they are mailed in waves — initial drops for different voter groups, followed by daily mailings for replacement ballots, new registrations, updated addresses, and more. Our office often issues and mails ballots within 24 hours to ensure voters receive them promptly. It is unclear what delays this portal requirement will introduce and how that will affect timely delivery to voters.

Our office already maintains rigorous data hygiene within the voter registration database. Our voter rolls are maintained by experienced and trained election administrators, many of whom are certified at both the state and national level.  We are the experts in voter list maintenance, not USPS. Imposing an additional requirement to upload constantly changing lists to a new portal adds significant administrative burden without providing meaningful benefit. In practice, this proposal adds unnecessary red tape rather than improving ballot visibility, voter access, or election security.

Washington’s Address Confidentiality Program (ACP) further complicates this requirement. The ACP offers survivors of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, or trafficking, and Criminal Justice Affiliates, Election Officials, and Protected Health Care Workers who are a target for threats or harassment, a substitute address to receive first class mail. The proposed rule does not explain how to include these voters without compromising their protected information.

Data Privacy and Cybersecurity Concerns

In addition, the proposed rule also raises significant data privacy and cybersecurity concerns. Election administrators operate under strict public disclosure laws when handling sensitive voter information. The participation list would link voter names and addresses with outbound and return envelope barcodes, creating a voter-level federal dataset far more sensitive than a standard mailing file. USPS plans to issue a new system of records notice under the Privacy Act, but that notice must be published, reviewed, and finalized before any voter-level ballot data submission is required.

USPS must clearly define data retention periods, access controls, audit logs, redisclosure limits, vendor access rules, breach notification procedures, and how law enforcement requests will be handled. As with the voter registration database, election administrators must be able to explain to voters what information is shared, why it is shared, how it is protected, and how long it is retained—information that must be available before any data submission is mandated.

Ballot Reconciliation

Our County has a long history of working collaboratively with USPS. Prior to each election, we notify USPS of our planned main mail drops, key election dates, and we provide copies of our Mailpiece Design Analyst-approved ballot envelopes. At the state level, USPS also joins election administrators on regular calls throughout the election period to troubleshoot any issues that may arise. Requiring notification of who will be on the mailing list—which changes constantly as voters register, move, or cancel their registration—serves no operational purpose.

The proposed rule states that this provision will evidence how many ballots have been mailed and allow law enforcement officials to compare the total number of ballots mailed to the total number of received ballots to detect potential issues meriting further investigation.

It also suggests that IMb scan data will provide visibility into ballot transmission. However, as outlined above, IMb scan data does not reliably or accurately reflect the movement of ballots through the mail. Even outbound scans are inconsistent, and delivery scans are frequently missing. In our county alone, several rural ZIP codes never receive delivery scans because the local post offices do not have the necessary technology. USPS can and should focus on improving their scanning procedures and operations to make these additional services and costs worth the price to both election offices and the voters we serve.

Election administrators already reconcile the number of ballots issued and the number received as part of established and robust ballot accountability procedures. That is standard practice in elections and is done by trained and experienced election administrators. The proposed rule does not recognize that ballots may be returned through multiple methods—by mail, through ballot drop boxes, in person at vote centers, or via email or fax for military and overseas voters. Vote-by-mail does not mean that voters can only return their ballot by mail.

Voters may also receive replacement or reissued ballots if they move or misplace their original ballot. There are numerous complexities in ballot issuance and return, established in state law and local procedures, that this proposed rule fails to recognize or account for.

When scanning effectively, USPS data can support mail visibility and help troubleshoot delivery issues, but it should not be characterized as a substitute for official election records, chain-of-custody documentation, or ballot reconciliation processes. The proposed requirement again fails to consider the realities of election administration and risks creating confusion rather than enhancing transparency, security, or integrity.

Conclusion

It’s critical that USPS withdraw this rule and essential to the strength of our democracy that it is not implemented ahead of the November 2026 General Election. While we are heartened by the recent court decision to enjoin USPS from initiating or completing this rule-making process, it’s important that USPS take formal and proactive steps to formally and publicly withdraw this rule from consideration.

Any rules regarding elections cannot and should not be made without deeper engagement with election administrators to understand the complexities of vote by mail, develop a realistic timeline for testing technical requirements, and provide detailed privacy protections, safeguards, and emergency procedures to ensure technical or administrative issues do not delay ballots or impede voter access.

Finalizing these proposed rules as written would create serious hurdles for election administrators and will undoubtedly disenfranchise thousands of voters. It would also set a dangerous precedent of a non-election agency playing the role of gatekeeper on our citizens’ right to vote. That is not a role that USPS has ever played, nor been tested in. The goal of all public servants should be to facilitate free and fair elections, not to create barriers and unnecessary hoops for voters and election administrators alike.

Our continued partnership with USPS on mail ballot visibility, effective envelope design, and clear communication is an extremely valuable operational practice and one that we hope to continue.  That history of partnership, and our ability to navigate our respective lanes within it, has been incredibly successful for vote by mail elections and the millions of Americans who vote in them. We urge USPS to continue to respect those differing roles in the elections process.

Key Risks

• Nonacceptance of ballot mail may delay or prevent timely delivery, potentially disenfranchising thousands of voters. Rejecting outbound ballots for technical or administrative mismatches—especially close to statutory deadlines—creates a significant risk of delayed ballots and will lead to voter disenfranchisement. The right to vote cannot be left up to untested and unnecessary data portals and list matching practices.
• Unique IMb requirements are costly and operationally infeasible. USPS scan rates are extremely low, costs are high, and many systems (including in‑house printing and online ballot delivery tools) cannot generate unique IMbs. There is no meaningful return on investment for this requirement, and it would be an irresponsible use of taxpayer dollars given the data at hand.
• Uploading voter lists to the ballot portal does not reflect real-time voter registration. In Washington, voters can register or update addresses through Election Day, meaning any list submitted 30+ days in advance is immediately outdated. The proposed portal will create delays in ballot mailing and may cost Americans their vote as it will hamper their ability to receive and return their ballot on time.
• The ballot portal lacks critical detail. No information is provided on processing timelines, error handling, delay prevention, or how USPS will manage continual updates required during the election period. Additionally, this portal does not yet exist and there is simply not time before the November 2026 General Election to build, test, and implement a new system, particularly when that system impacts voters’ access to their ballot.
• USPS IMb scan data is not reliable for reconciliation purposes. USPS scan rates are inconsistent and often skipped by USPS throughout the mailing process. Ballots may also be returned through multiple methods outside the USPS system. USPS data cannot substitute for official election records or state‑mandated reconciliation procedures, and the data this rule purports to create already exists as part of those legally mandated processes.
• New reporting requirements add administrative burden without improving voter access. Constantly changing voter lists and multiple ballot mailing waves make the proposed requirements impractical and duplicative of existing, more accurate systems that have been tested and refined over many elections and many years. Thousands of updates are processed every day in King County for voters who have moved or changed their name. This rule does not reflect reality, either for election administrators or for voters.
• Creation of a sensitive federal voter‑level dataset poses privacy and cybersecurity risks. Strong safeguards to protect voter data must be clearly defined, as they are for election administrators in state law.

Key Recommendations

• Withdraw this rule from consideration.
• Do not finalize any elections-related rules without direct engagement with election administrators. USPS should collaborate with local and state election officials to understand vote by mail operations and test requirements before implementation.
• Remove the nonacceptance provision. USPS should prioritize ballot delivery and use collaborative troubleshooting, not rejection, when mismatches or technical issues occur. Failing to do so will cost Americans their right to vote.
• Eliminate or provide flexibility for unique IMb requirements. Allow continued use of generic IMbs for return envelopes, and account for systems that cannot generate unique codes. The significant cost of this requirement must also be considered, as should USPS’ adherence to their own scanning policies and procedures.
• Eliminate the ballot portal or clarify how it will be tested and operate before requiring data submission. Define processing timelines, update frequency, error handling, delay mitigation, and how time sensitive mailings will be protected.
• Ensure ACP and similar protected address programs are fully accommodated. USPS must provide explicit procedures to protect substitute address voters from exposure. We are required by both law and morality to protect these vulnerable voters from having their personal information disclosed or exposed. It is not an exaggeration to say that lives will be at risk if this information is not fully protected as Washington law requires.
• Publish and finalize the Privacy Act system of records notice before implementation. Define retention periods, access controls, audit logs, redisclosure limits, breach notifications, and handling of law enforcement requests.
• Acknowledge that USPS data cannot replace official election reconciliation processes. Ballot tracking data should support ballot visibility, not the statutory chain of custody and reconciliation procedures already in place. It is not a substitute nor a needed or helpful supplement.

A thoughtful, collaborative approach is essential to ensuring that any new USPS requirements regarding election mail strengthen election administration, not hinder it. Local election offices, including ours, and the millions of voters that we serve rely on predictable mail service, clear guidance, and tested systems to meet strict legal deadlines and uphold public trust. By working directly with election administrators, evaluating real world impacts, and refining these provisions before implementation, USPS can help support a secure, efficient vote by mail system that helps Americans participate in our elections and democracy, rather than disenfranchising them.

Sincerely, 

Julie Wise, Elected Director of Elections

Janice Case, Deputy Director of Elections

Kendall LeVan Hodson, Chief of Staff

Jerelyn Hampton, Election Operations Division Director

Molly Gordon, TECHGIS Division Director

Meredith Merriman, Administrative Services Manager

Halei Watkins, Communications Manager

Kenny Austin, Voter Services Manager